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In the Supreme Court, State of Utah
JOHN A. M. A.LIA, State Bank Connnissioner
of the State of Utah, and HER.B~-:Il'J' 'r.A.YLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquidation of tl1e Bank of Heber City,
vs.
Plaintiffs and R.espondents,
J. HAROLD GII_jES a11d JOSIE BAIR.D
GILES,
Defendants and Appellants~
A. C. MOULTON and E. DE"\~VEY ~IOUL'rON,
vs.
Plaintiffs and R.et;pondents,
VERNOR E. BAIR-D and l\iARY A. BAIRD,
His Wife, J. RULON ~fOR-GAN, J. R.UI_jON
MORGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership,
ELIZABETH J. BAIR-D, BANK OF HEBER
CITY, RULON F. ST ARLEY~ State Bank
Commissioner of the State of Utah, and
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in
Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber 1410
City, ARTHUR D1TKE and EULEAN DUKE, Civil
Hjs Wife, RAY F. Sl\tfiTH and JOSIE BAIRD
GILES Sl\1ITH, His Wife, and J. HAROLD
GII_jES,
Defendants and Appellants.
J. RULON MORGAN,
vs.
Cross-Complainant,
RULON F. ST ARLEY, as Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C.
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the
I1iquidation of the Bank of Heber City,
j
Cross-Defendants.
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In the Supreme Court, State of Utah
JOHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquidation ?f the Bank of Heber City,
vs.
Plaintiffs and R.espondents,
J. HAROLD GILES and JOSIE BAIR,D
GII.JES,
Defendants and Appellants:

)

1266
\Civil
)

A. C. MOULTON and E. DE·WEY ~fOULTON,
vs.
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD,
His \Vife, J. RULON ~IORGAN, J. RUI~O·N
MORGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership,
ELIZABETH J. BAIRD, BANK OF HEBER
CITY, RULON F. ST ARLEY~ State Bank
Commissioner of the State of Utah, and
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in
Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber 1410
City, ARTHUR D1TKE and EUI_JEAN DUlCE, 'Civil
His Wife, RAY F. SMITH and JOSIE BAIRD
GILES SMITH, His Wife, and J. HAROLD
GII.JES,
Defendants and Appellants.
J. RULON MORGAN,
vs.
Cross-Complainant,
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C.
'rAYI_jOR, as Examiner in Charge of the
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,
Cross-Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
THERE ARE T·WO CASES\ INVOLVED· IN THIS
CONTROVERSY.
The appellants, J. Rulon Morgan, J. Rulon Morgan as executor of the last will and testamPnt of
Elizabeth J. Baird, deceased, J. Rulon Morgan, as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.
the surviving partner of the firm of ~forgan &
Morgan, Vernor E. Baird and his wife, Mary A.
Baird, Josie Baird Gile8 (Smith) and her husband, Ray F. Smith, jointly and severally prosecute this appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Wasatch County, Utah. The judg
ment appealed from disposes of the issues raised
in two causes of action, one numbered 1266 Civil,
and the other numbered 1410 Civil. The two cause~
were tried ~ogether, and, upon stipulation of counsel, the cases were cons,olidated for all purposes.
( Tr. 117; A b. 75). Substantially all of the issues
raised by the plaintiffs in Cause No. 12:66 Civil are
also raised by the pleadings in Cause No. 1410
.Civil.
1
-

STATEMENT OF CASE IN NUMBER 1266

CIVIL
In case numbered 1266 Civil the Bank of Heber City
and its examiner in charge, Herbert Taylor, Bank
Commissioner of Utah, brought an action agiainst
Josie Baird Giles and .J. Harold Giles to recover
judgment on a note executed by J. Harold Giles for
the p.rincipal sum of Two Thousand, Five Hundred
Flifty ('$2550.00) Dollars. The note is dated A.pril
26, 1933. There is no controversy as to the amount
owing on the note. The question '\Vhich divides the
parties in 1266 Civil is whether or not the Bank of
Hel')er City, and those in control of its assets, has a
lien on forty-nine shares of water stock in the Lake
Creek Irrigation Company as security for the payment of the note sued upon. The p~laintiffs in that
case contended that they do have such a lien by
reason of the certificates having been hypothecated
to the Biank of Heber City as s.ecurity for the note.
The appellants contend to the contrary, because. as
tho~.,. ·claim, the name of Josie Baird Giles (Sn1ith)
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forged on the certificates and that no authority
'vas ever given to J. Harold Gile~ to hypothecate the
water stock as security for the note. The court be ..
low ;held that the plaintiffs in that case had a lien
upon the certificates and entered a decree directing
that said certificates be sold and sufficient of the
proceeds derived fron1 su<:h sale be applied to the
payment of the note.
1\ppellants prosecute this
appeal and seek a reversal of that part of the decree w. hich awards plaintiffs a lien on the certificates and directs that the same be sold at sheriff's
sale and sufficient of the proceeds from the sale be
applied to the payment of the note, attorneyH' fees
and costs.
\Yas

STATE·~fENT

OF CASE NO. 1410

In case No. 1410 Civil, A. C. Moulton and E. De,vey
Moulton brought an,action to recover a judgment
on a note for the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand
Dollars ~nd to foreclose a mortgage on a tract of
land, together with the certificates. of water stock
held by the Bank of Heber City and othe,r water
rights appurtenant to the land covered by the
mortgage. The note and mortgage sued upon by
the Moultons is signed hy Vernor E. Baird and 'his
wife, Mary A. Baird, in favor of Josie Baird Giles
(Smith), but the Moultons claim title to the note
and mortgage by reason of having attached and
later purchased under a.n execution sale the notr- and
mortgage in an action brought by the M.oultons
against J. Harold Giles and Josie Baird Giles. The
appellants, by their variouR answers. deny that the
Moultons have any right to maintain their action
because:
1.
The note and mortgage which the Moultons ~eek 'to
foreclose was. p-rior to the time the l\foultons
attempted to levy on the note and mortgage, by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mutual agreement of Josie Baird Giles (Smith),
Vernor E. Baird and Elizabeth J. Baird cancelled,
and that pursuant to such agreement, prior to the
attempted purchase of the note and mortgage by
the Moultons at the sheriff's sale, such mortgage
was released and the land and water right covered
by the mortgage conveyed to Elizabeth J. Baird.
')

~-

That the Moultons did not acquire any title to the
note and mortgage which they seek to foreclose because:
(a) The note and mortgage which the
Moult.ons seek to foreclose was helrl by
George B. Stanley, attorney for Josie
Baird Giles (Smith) ''and Vernor E. Baird,
and by him turned over to the sheriff of
Wasatch County so that such sheriff could
sell the same to satisfy a claim in favor of
the Moultons, who were also represented
by Mr. Stanley when he delivered the note
to the sheriff.
(b) That the attachment, the execution,
the notice of sale and the attempted sale
of the note and mortgage \Vere each and all
null and vo(id{- because not ronducted in
conformity with law and therefore they
have no right, title or interest jn the note
and mortgage.
(c) That the Moultons having paid only,
or pretended to pay, the nominal sum of
One Hundred Dollar~ 'for the note for Fifteen Thousand Dollars, together with
several years accrued interest thereon, such
sale is unconscionable land void.
(d) That in any event the Moultons
acquired only such interest in the note and
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n1ortgage as "\Yns O\Yned by Josie Baird
Giles (Smith) at the time of the levy, and
Josie Baird Giles (Smith) having no interest, or at most a defeasible rig~ht to the
note and mortg-age, the 1\loultons, by the
attachment and levy or execution and sale,
acquired no enforceable right in the note
and Inortgage "\vhich 'they s,eek to foreclose.
(e) That prior to the pretended p~urchase
of the note and mortgage, the mortgage
had been released and the p-roperty conveyed to Elizabeth J. Baird, which release _
and conveyance were of-record in the office
of the County Recorder of Wasatch County,
l~tah.

In case No. 1266 Civil, J. Rulon 1\{organ filed a
cross-complaint against the State Bank Commissioner, the Bank of Heber City and Spencer C.
Taylor, examiner in charge of the Bank of Heber
City, in which it iB 1claimed tnat Elizabeth J. Baird
is the owner of the water stock in any event because
of having purchased the same from the Lake Creek
Irrigation Company after that company ·had purchased that water stock because an assessment
levied thereon had not been paid, and also because
the water right representPd by the certificate of
water stock had been-· acquired by Elizabeth J.
Baird bv
.. reason of adverse use of such 'vater by
.
Elizabeth J. Baird.
-

The court below held that the Moultons were the
O\Yners of the note and mortgage upon which they
sue and directed that the mortgage be foreclosed
and the proceeds of the sale thereof he applied to
the payment of the judgment which the Moultons
h0ld Rffainst J. Harold Gile~ and Josie Baird Giles
(Smith), which judgment is in the sum of Fonr
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'rhousand Nine Hundred Seventy-four Dollars and
sixty-seven cents, together v.rith interest thereon
from October 3, 1934, and costs in the sum of Fourteen Dollars t'venty cents. The appellants proBecute this appeal to revers.e the judgment in favor
of the Moultons.
After the court below orally announced that the
Bank of Heber City and its examiner in charge,
Spencer C. Taylor, and the Bank Commissioner of
Utah were entitled to prevail on their claim to a
lien on the two certificates of water stock in the
Lake Cree.k Irrigation Company, and also after
the court below had orally announced that tho
Moultons were entitled to ~ue upon the fifteen
thousand dollar note and foreclose the mortgage on
the land and water stock mentioned and described
in the mortgage, Josie Baird Giles (Smith) and J·.
Rulon Morgan, as executor of the estate of Elizabeth J. Baird, Deceased; filed a petition wherein
Morgan) as executor of the estate of Elizabeth J.
Baird, Deceased, sought to P.nforce a claim of homestead against the property involved in this controversy, by reason of the fact that Josie Baird
Giles (Smith) had such claim at the time she conveyed the land and "'\Vater stock covered by the
mortgage to Elizabeth J. Baird. and therefore
Elizabeth J. Baird acqu]recl nn interes.t in the propprtv so conveyed to heT to the extent of a.11v claim
of homestead that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) had
at the time .of the conveyance to he·r mother, Elizabeth J. Baird. The court below denied any claim
of a homestead. The appe-llants also attack that
'part of the judgment which denies the claim of a
homestead for and on behalf of J. Rulon Morg~n
as executor of the last will and testament of Elizabeth J. Baird, Deceased.
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ASSIGN~IEXTS

OF. ERROR IN C.A.USE NO.
1266 CIVIL

The :appellants haYe fifty-fiYe1 assignn1ents of
error. Of these assignments those nu1nbered 9, 24,25, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 ,48, 50, 51, 52, J.),
54 and 55, Ab. 225 to 244, 'attack the finding·s, conclusions of la'\v and decree 'Yith respect to the claim
of liens by the plaintiffs in cause numbered 1266,
the Bank of Heber City, its examiner in charge of
the liquidation thereof and the Bank Commissioner
of Utah.

THE

QUESTIONS

PR.ESENTED FOR DETER~IINATION BY
ASS I G Nl\f EN T S
TOUCHING THE CLAIM. OF A I1IEN 0],
THE BANK O,F HEBER CITY, rri-IE EXAMINER IN CH.P.LRGE OF THE LIQUID.t\TION THERE,OF AND THE BANI( COMMISSIONER OF UTAH..

The questions presented for determination by the
assignments affecting the claim of a lien of the
Bank of Heber City, the examiner in charge of the
liquidation thereof and the Bank Commissioner of
Utah are these :

1.
May a husband, without the knowledge or consent
of his wife, {take certificates of '\Vater stock belonging to the wife and lawfully hypothecate· the same.
to secure his personal note~

2.
If the husband takes Rnch certificates of his wife
w·ithout her kno,vledge or consent and hypothecates
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them to secure his personal obligations to a bank,
may such bank successfully maintain a lien on such
certificates of stock as security for a note executed
by the husband s.ome four years after it first received the certificates, in the absence of the consent of the wife to have her water stock used by
the husband for such purpose.
May a bank successfully maintain the claim of being a bona fide holder for value of a certificate of
stock where the blank endorsement on the back of
such certificate is forged and lrnovvn to be such by
the officer of the bank 'vho accepts the ·certificate
as security for a loan.
4.
May a hank successfully maintain the claim of bein-g a bona fide holder for value of a certificate of
stock endorsed in very light lead pencil by a wife
when such certificate is accompanied by another
certificate of stock upon which the wife's signature
is forged and the officer of the bank 'vho accepts
the certificates knows that the signature ·on the
accompanying certificate is not that of the wtfe,
where the husband presenb:; the two certificates to
secure a personal loan for himself.

5.
Does the fact that a husband attends to his 'vife's
business and the wife occasionally draws che·cks on
the hus.ba.nd 's bank account preclude the wife from
questioning the right of the ba~k to a lien on certificates of stock which have, without the lmo\\'ledge
or consent of the wife, been hypothecated to the
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bank to secure the payment of his personal note,
especially \vhere ;there is no plea of an estoppel.

6.
May a bank "rhich holds certifi,cates of \Vater stock
maintain a lien thereon against one \\rho has purchased the stock from the company "'. hich issued
the same and "rhich has levied an aRs.essment thereon and because of non-payment of the assessment
has purchased the same and resold it to another.

7.
May a bank which receives certificates of \Vater
stock'from the husband of the ovlner thereof maintain a lien thereon where th~ wat.er rep1resented by
the certificates of stock has been sold and by warranty deed conveyed to another who has used such
water advers.ely under a claim of rig-ht for ten
years prior to the time such o\vner's right is brought
in question.

ASSIGN~IENTS

OF ERROR TOUCHING THE
CL ...t\.IMS OF THE MOULTONS, PL.A.L\INTIFFS IN CAUSE 1410 CIVIL.

Of the fifty-five assignments of error filed, those
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 2.3, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 321
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, )52,
53, 54 and 55 attack the proceedings had and the
findings, conclusions and judgment made in favor
of A. C. Moulton and E. Dewey lVloulton> who were
the plaintiffs in cause numbered 1410 Civil.
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QUESTIO,NS PRESENTED FOR DETERMINA.TION IN THE ACTION BRO,UGHT BY
THE MOULTONS IN CAUSE NO. 1410
CIVIL.
The questions presented for determination as to
the Moultons, who were the plaintiffs in Cause No.
1410 Civil, are as follows:

1.
Does the preponderance of the evidence support
the finding made by the court below to the effect
that no agreement was had between \Tern or E.
Baird, Josie Baird Giles (Smith) and Elizabeth J.
Baird, whereby the fifteen thousand dollar note
was cancelled, the mortgage given to secure the
same released, and the property covered by the
mortgage conveyed by Vern or E. Baird to Elizabeth J. Baird in payment of money owing lJy
Josie Baird Giles (Smith) to Elizabeth J. Baird.

2.
George B. Stanley having acted for .Josie Baird
Giles (Smith) and Vern or E. Baird in preparing
the documents whereby Josie Baird Giles (Smith)
sold and conveyed the land and water right to Ver·
nor E. Baird and the note and mortgage from Vernor E. Baird and his wife to Josie Baird Giles
(Smith), and he, George B. Stanley, having retained
poss,ession of the note, may a valid attachment or a
valid sale under execution be made by a sheriff
where the note was delivered to the sheriff by
Georf.!e B. Stanley so that he, George B. Stanley,
and his other clients the ::1\foultons, could collect
the'ir judgment against Josie Baird Giles (Smith)
and J. Harold Giles.
~

Was the affidavit of the Moultons for a 'vrit of
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attachment a sufficient compliance with the provisions of R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1 and 104-18-3 to
authorize the county clerk of .,v- asatch County, Utah
to issue a "Trit of attachn1ent.

4.
Did the wilful delivery of the note to the s.heriff of
Wasatch County, Utah, by George B. Stanley, the
agent and attorney of Josie Baird Giles (Smith),
without her knowledge or consent, constitute a
valid levy of attachment or an execution sale of the
note.

5.
Does the _preponderance of the evidence, or any of
the evidence, support the finding that George B.
Stanley did not have possession of the note involved
in this controversy as the attorney for \7 ernor E.
Baird or Josie Baird Giles (Smith), or any of the
defendants.

6.
Was the bond furnished by the ~foultons for the
writ of attachment a sufficient compliance \vith
the provisions of R. ·S. U. 1933, 104-18-4 to authorize the sheriff to attach the note in question.

7.
Does the return of the sheriff show that he complied with the law in advertising the note for sale.

8.
Was it competent for the Moultons to show, over
the objections of the appellants, that the return
made by the sheriff \Vas not in conformity with
the facts.

9.
Does the evidence, including the testimony of the
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sheriff, show that the notice of the time and pJace
of the sale was posted as by law required.
10.
Does the p.reponderance of the evidence show that
the sheriff sold the note to the Moultons as. by the
notice directed, or that the time of sale mentioned in
the notice was postponed.
11.
Will a ~court of equity sustain the sale of a secured
note for fifteen thousand dollars, together with
several years accrued interest thereon, for the sum
of one hundred dollars.
1

12.
In ligiht of the fact that the water s.tock which
Josie~~Baird Giles (Smith) sold to Vernor E. Baird
was ·held and claimed by the Bank of Heber City,
did not Vernor E. Baird have an absolute right to
rescind the contract for the purchase of the land
and water right covered by the mortgage and convey the prop·erty back to Josie Baird Giles (S1nith)
or her nominee, Elizabeth J. Baird.
13.
If Vern or E. Baird had an absolute right to rescind
the contract. of sale and purchase of the land and
water right and the giving of the note and mo.rtgag18 as evidence of the pi1rchase price· as against
Josie Baird Giles (Smith), did he not also have such
right as against any claim the Moultons may have
acquired by' the purchase of the note.
14.
Does the evidence support the finding that Elizabeth J. Baird did not, during her lifetime, purchase certificates No. 64 and 68 from the La.ke Creek
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Irrigation Company, 'rhich had acquired such cer ..
tificates by purchasing the same to pay delinquent
assessments thereon.

15.
Did not Josie Baird Giles (Smith) have a right to
the claim of a homestead to the note in question
'vhich she had an absolute right to release upon the
condition that Vernor E. Baird convey the property covered by the mortg~age in question to her
mother, Elizabeth Jo Baird.

ARG1Th1ENT TOUCHIXG THE CLAIMED I~IEN
OF THE BANK OF HE:BER CITY AND ITS
SUCCESSORS~

In the main there is no conflict in the 'evidence
touching the claimed lien of the B·ank of Reher City
and its successors. These facts are established
without any conflict in the evidence:
Prior to May 21, 1929, J. Harold Giles had, from
time to time, borro,ved money from the Bank of
Heber City, and given his notes as evidence of the
loans. On or· about May 21, 1929 he executed a rene,val note for Seventeen Hundred Dollars (Tr. 181;
Ab. 151). At the time the Seventeen Hundred Dullar note was given to the bank, J. Harold Giles deposited with the bank t\vo certificates of stock in
the I1ake Creek Irrigation Company. On the hack
of each certificate· "ras endorsed in blank the nan1e
of .Josie Baird Giles.. In neither of the certificates
was there a specified person named as endorsee.
There was a blank space for the endorsee~ but the
hlnnk ''""flS not filled in. The signature of Jo~ie
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Baird Giles on Certificate No. 68 is not her signature. (Finding 24; Ab. 95). \All of the evidence
supports that finding. The signature on Certificate No. 64 is written in very faint lead pencil.
There is a cross in front of the signature. The
court found that the signature on Certificate No.
64 is the signature of Josie Baird Giles (Finding
24; A b. 95). There is a conflict in the evidence as
to whether or not the signature on Certificate No.
64 is that of .Josie Baird Giles. J. Harold Giles
testified that the signature on the back oi Certificate No. 64 looks like the signature of Josie Baird
Giles and that he would say it was her signature.
(Tr. 299; Ab. 176). Josie Baird Giles testified that
the signature on Certificate No. 64 looked something like her signature but that her best judgment
was that it was not her signature. (Tr. '258 to 263;
A b. 166 to 169).
:All of the evidence is to the effect that Josie Baird
Giles did not authorize anyone to sign her ·name to
either of the certificates and that she did not authorize her then husband, J. Harold Giles, to deliver
the same to the Bank of Heber City· as security for
any loan. (Testimony of Josie Baird Giles, Tr.
258-259; Ab. 168). Such is also the effect of the
testimony of J. Harold Giles (Tr. 2'95 to 299; Ab
175-176). "While the name of W. Emer Murdock
appears as a witness to the shmature of Josie Baird
Giles, no claim is made by ~!fr. Murdock. or anyone, that Josie signed either of the certificates in
his presence. Mr. Murdock placed his signature
nn the rprtificatPs so thRt they could he turned over
to the Federal Reserve Bank as security. (Tr. 183;
. .L\b. 151). Thus the evidence shows, without conflict, that Josie Baird Giles did not authorize her
then husband, J. Harold Giles, to hypothecate
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either of the certificates to secure the loan made to
J. Harold Giles.
We ha,.,.e attacked the court's finding tha.t the signature on Certificate No. 64 i-, that of J-osie Baird
Giles (Assigmnent -!-±; Ab. :24:2), but as the evidence is brief and there are in the exhibits signatures of Josie Baird Giles 'vhich she signed at
the time of the trial, and also her signature in the
divorce proceeding~s against J. Harold Giles, we
direct this Court's attention to those signatures,
which the Court, if it deems the matter material,
may examine. It may here he said that no claim is'
made that J. Harold Giles had any interest in
either of the certificates. They were the absolute
property of Josie Baird Giles. They were part· of
the property which she inherited from her father.
(Finding 24; A b. 95). At the time the Seventeen·
Hundred Dollar note was executed and the certifi:cates left 'vith the bank, J. Harold Giles signed a
pledge agreement, Exhibit B-2. The pledge agreement does not p~urport to bind Josie Baird Giles.
After the Seventeen Hundred Dolla.r note was
signed, payments w~re made thereon and renewal
notes signed for any balanee unpaid on the original
note and for additional money loaned to J. Harold
Giles. Josie did not sign any of these notes. At
one time a payment of Fifteen Hundred Dollars
was made on the Se,. . enteen Hundred Dollar note,
reducing it to Two Hundred Dollars. (1_1 e3ttmony
of Riley C. Draper, Tr. 200-201; Ab. 154).
The evidence also shows that Josie .kept the certificates 'in an envelope in her trunk ( rrr. 280-2Rl ; A b.
172). The first that Josie learned that the bank
held her certificates was in 1933 when her mother,
Elizabeth J. Baird, ·wTote to her while she was. in
California. That ",.aR after the Bank of Heber
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City had closed, which was on August 29, 1933.
When Josie came back to Utah she made inquiry
at the bank as to her .certificates and was informed
that the note and certificates were held by the
Federal Reserve Bank at Salt Lake City. I.1ater
Josie went to Salt Lake City and asked to see the
certificates. She was informed that the certificates were in the vault and that she ·was unable
to see them.· She informed the bank that she had
not signed tne certificates.. She was infor1ned by
the hank that there was a cross opposite her nauw.
and probably th~ certificates had been sent to her
for her signature. · (Tr. 253, 255; A b. 166-167).
- -- . - --~·, . - r,
.
Notwithstanding there was no pleading which even
remotely suggested that Josie Baird Giles "'as
estopped from ~etting up the defense that she dirl
not sign or authorize anyone to sign the certificates
and did not authori~e J. Harold Giles to hypothecate her certificates as s.ecurity for a loan made
hy the. bank to him, the court below admitted evidence tending to show that J. Harold Giles attended
to the business of his- then wife, Josie Baird Giles,
from 1926 to 1929 7 and that Jo~ie Baird Giles. at
times drew checks on the account of her then husbaniL J. ,.Harold Giles, about like the other wives
- ·in Heber .-City. (Testimony of Josie Baird Giles,
· Tr. 268 to 290; A b. 168 to 194. Testimony of J .
. ·Harold· Giles, Tr. 295-296; Ah. 175-176; Testimony
of Mr. Murdock, Tr. 198; Ah. 153). It al~o appears
that in about 1929 ,Josie Baird Giles sold a home
for the sum of about Twenty-five Hundred Dolla.rs. The money she secured from the sale of the
. home sbr- lraned to her husband, J. Harold Giles,
and took his note for Twenty-five Hundred Dollars. (Exhibit No. 11; Tr. 291; Ab. 174-175).
Suit was brought on the note involved in this litigation on . A.ngust 14, 1934. It "ras upon substantially
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the foregoing evidence that the court below made
its finding·s and rendered its judgn1ent, holdjng
that the plaintiff Bank of Heber City, Spencer 0.
Taylor in charge of the liquidation of the bank, and
the State Bank Commissioner of lJtah had a lien
upon the certificates of stock a.s security for the
payment of. the note.
The appellants have, by their assignments of error,
attacked those findings, by which the trial ,court in
effect found that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) had
hypothecated the certificates of stock to the Bank
of Heber City, and that it and its successors have a
lien upon the stocki a.s security for the payment of
the note of J. Harold Giles.. The assignments
which attacked such findings are 14, 15, 41, 43, 44,
45 and 46; Ab. 233 to 242. By assignments No. 48,
50, ~1 and 52, Ab. 242, 243, appellants have attacl{ed
Conclusions of Law No. 2, 5, 6 and 9, where the
court below concluded that the Bank of Heber City
acquired and still holds a valid lien up,on the t'vo
certificates of stock involved in this controyersy.
By assignment No. 49 appellants attack that part
of the -decree wherein it is directed that the stock
be sold and the proceeds be applied by the hank to
the payment of the ·amount owing upon the note of
J. Harold Giles. All of these assignn1enb;; of error
may well be discussed together, and "\Ve shall so
discuss them.
The Bank of Heber City did not acquire a lien on
the certificates of stock and its SUCCe8HOrS do not
have such a lien. The lavv is "rell settled that since
certificates of stock are not negotiable instruments,
a transferee acquires no bettE:lr )title than his transferor had unless the circumstance~ are ~uch as to
er('at~ an estop·pel jn hiR favor. It follovvs that. a
trnn~fer of· a certificate of stock, even to a bona
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fide purchaser or pledgee by one 'vho has no title
or authority to transfer thQ same·, gives the transferee no title to the stock as against the true owner,
unless the latter is, for some reason, .e~topped to
assert his title, or exceprt in those jurisdictions
which have adopted the Uniform Stork Transfer
Act.
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, \7" olun1e
12, Pa.ge 58, ·Section 5542.
Among the cases cited in support .Qf and 'vhieh do
8Upp~rt the text are the following:
E. Birmingham Land Company v. Dennis,
95 Ala. 565; 5 So. 317. ·
Doran v. Miller, 124 Ill. A.pp. 56; 151 Ill.
52'6, affirmed, 245 Ill. 200; 91 N. E.
1029.

BorBtaw v. City Trust Company, 216 Mass.
330; 103 N. W. 915.
Shuma.cker v. Green-Hanenea Copper Co.,
157 Minn. 124.
Knox v. Eden Muss·ee American Co., 148
N. Y. 441; 42 N. E. 988.
Biddle v. Boyard, 13 Pa. St. 150.
In the absence of a statute the law announced in
the foregoinm text and cases seems to be well settled
and to the effect that shares of s.tock represented
by a certificate are 'in the main subject to the san1e
rules of law that app,ly to the sale of personal property, and that certificates are not in any sense
negotiable instruments.
We do not have the Uniform Tr:=tnsfer Act, but we
do hav~ a number of statutory provisions touching
the transfer of stock in a corporation. The owner
of a certificate of stock does not pa.ss title thereto
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if the delivery is made "'ithout authorization of the
owner, unless the certificate has been transferred
to a purchaser for value in good faith, \Yithout the
notice of any fact making the transfer wrongful,
where the injured person has elected to_, \vaive the
injury or has been guilty of laches in endeavoring
to enforce his right.

R. S. U. 1933, 1S-3-7.
''The person to ,,,.hom a certificate was
originally issued is the person appearing
by the certificate to be the owner thereof
and of the shares represented thereby, until and unless he endorses the certificate to
another specified person, and thereupon
such other specified person is the person
appearing by the certificate to be the owner
thereof until and unless he also endorses
the certificate to another specified person.
Sub~equent special endorsements may be
made with like effect. ' '
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-19.

As to Certificate No. 68 'vhich contains a forged
blank endorsement, the authorities are all to the
effect that such an endorsement did not convey any
right or title to the Bank of Heber City. The law
to that effect is so uniform that we refrain fro1n
citing cases in support thereof. Such is the law
even where the endorsee does not know the signature on the certificates is forged. !Ir. Murdock
testified that he had cashed checks signed by Josie
Baird Giles drawn on the account of J. Harold
Giles. In such case Mr. Murdock cannot be heard
to say that he did not know the signature of Josie
Baird Giles or that the signature on Certificate
No. 68 "'"as not a forgery. Whatever right a busSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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band had in the property of his wife under the old
common la-\v, there can be no controversy that the
law in this jurisdiction gives to the wife the same
right to own and dispo~e of her prop,erty as is given
to a husband.
R. S. U. 1933, 40-·2-1 to 10.

A hus-band cannot, without the wife's consent, give
a lien on the property of his wife.
Morrison-Merrill & Company v. Close, 20
Utah 432; 59 P. 235.
While there is evidence in this record tending to
show that the signature on Certifi-cate 64 is that
:of Josie Baird Giles, still, even if that be true, the
bank may not be said to have received that c.ertificate without notice of its infirn1ities.. 1'he f8ct
that Certificate No. 64 accompanied Certificate No.
68, which was forged, is a circumstance that should
have put the bank on notice. So ah;;o the fact that
the Isignature was in very faint lead pencil and the
signature was not witnessed 'vhen received by the
bank indicates that there "Tas some irregularity
ronnected with the signature- of Josie. The hank
could not close its eyes to thos.e irregularities.
10 C. J. S., Section 326, P·ag;e 823, and
10 C. J. S., Section 328-B, Page 826,
and cases there cited.

West v. Tin tic Standard !Jiining Con1pany,
71 Utah 158; 263 P. 490.
Moreover, the Bank of Heber (~iiy is chargeable
~rith notice of the fact that Josie Baird Giles was
the o'vner of the certificates· and the s.tock represented thereby at the time they were delivered to
the bank by J. Harold Giles. That is true even
though the blank endorsement on the certificates
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
were in all respects regular. It 'vill be noted that
the name of. the transferee does not appear on the
certificates. Josie Baird Giles therefore appeared
to be and "Tas the owner thereof u11til and unless
she endorsed the certificates to a specified person.
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-19.
Ther~

being no specified person to \Vhorn the certificates were endorsed, th~ bank knew, or should
have known, that the certificates belonged to Josie
Baird Giles. In this connection it may be observed
that J. Harold Giles in signing the pledg~e agreement did not even purport to pledge the interest
of his 'vife Josie in either of the certificates. There
is not in this record the slightest sugg~estion that
J. Harold Giles had any interest in the certificates
except that in his testimony he suggests "I took
~he certificates to the hank beeause I thought we
were in business-partnership - was married and
I was doing her business." If a husband, upon
such a pretext, can dissipate his \vife 's, es,tate, then
indeed is the law touching the right of a married
woman to own, and control her property rendered
a farce. It is quite common for a husband to do
business (whatever may he meant by business) for
his wife, and the wife to do business for the husband, but that does not authorize the husband nor
the 'vife to confiscate the- property of the other
spouse. So far as nppears, Josie never at any
time authorized her husband to convey away or
pledge her property for the debts of her husband.
The mere fact that J. Harold Giles ran the farm
and sheep belonging to Josie does not justify or
even tend to justify the conclusion that he had a
right to take Josie's stock to the bank and use the
same to secure his not.P. Nor is there any eviclnnrP jn this record ,.vhich sho,Ys or tends to sho'v
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

that Josie Baird Giles received any consid~ration
for her interest in the stock certificate; nor that
~he received any of the money derived from the
notes \vhich Harold signed at the bank. On the
contrary, she loaned to her husband, J. "Harold
Giles, the sum :of Twenty-five Hundred D·ollars, no
part of which was. ever repaid to ·her. Nor is there
anv evidenc~ which sho"\.YS or tends to show that
J o~ie was guilty of any laches in asserting her right
or that the Bank of Heber City \vas n1isled by any.
thing which J os.ie did or failed to do with respect
to the notes of her husband. It further is made
to appea.r, without conflict, that no renewal note
was executed after Josie learned tha.t her then husband had hypothecated the certifica.te8 of stock .
rhe trial court's finding No. 24, A b. 94 and 95,
seems to squint at the notion that Josie Baird Giles
was and that .J. Rulon Morgan as executor of the
last will and testament of Elizabeth J, Baird is
estopped from questioning the claimed lien on the
stock certificates. It is., to r"sa.y the least, extremely
doubtful if the findings made by the court bPlow
are sufficient to support the conclusion of law and
decree to the effect that the Bank of Heber City
acquired a lien on the. stock to secure the SeventP.en
Hundred Dollar note executed by J. Harold Giles
at the time the stock certjficates were delivered to
the bank. much less tho Twenty-five Hundred Dollar note sued upon in caRe No. 1266 Civil.
lt is the uniform holding of the authorities that
one who relies upon an estoppel must plead and
prove the facts so relied upon. In this case the
bank and its representatives do not plead an
estop.pel and offer no proof in support tlu~roof, except that J. :Harold Giles tended to the business of
,Josie. Apparently attending to her business mean~
that he ran the farm and the sheep helonging to
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.Josie. That an estoppel n1ust be pleaded and proven
has been the repeated holding of this Court.
Bero'v v. Shields, 48 Utah 2/0; 159 P. 53B.
Cole v. Sugar Company, 35 Utah 148; 9~
P. 681.
The essential elements of equitable estoppel as relating to the party estopped a.re :

''1. Conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material
facts, or at least which is calculated to
convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than and inconsistent with those
which the party subsequently atten1pts to
assert.

2. Intention or at least expectation that
such conduct shall be acted upon by the
other party.
3. Kno"rledge, actual or constructive of
the real facts.''

As relating to the party claiming the estoppel they

are:
'·1. The lack of knowledg·e and of the
means of knowledge of the truth as to the
facts in question.
2. Reliance upon the conduct of the party
estopped.
3. Action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially."

19 American Jurisprudence, Pages 642-643.
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a ted as to any estoppel of either Josie Baird Giles
or her successor in interest, J. Rulon Morgan as
executor of the Last ·Will and Testament of Elizabeth J. Baird, nor is the Bank of IIeber City, nor
1ts success,or in a position to evoke estoppel be ..
cause, as heretofore pointed out, it cannot be heard
to say that it did not know the stock belongred to
Josie Baird Giles, nor did Josie Baird Giles do
anything which was calculated to mislead the bank.
Nor is there any pleading or evidence which supports or tends to support a clain1 that J os.ie Baird
Giles or her successor in interest has waived her
right to the stock freed from any claim of the bank,
or that either of them have ratified the acts of
J. Harold Giles in hypothecating the stock certificates.
Even though it should be conceded, contrary to all
the evidence, that Josie Baird Giles consented to
the hypothecation of her stock in 1929 as security
for the Seventeen Hvndred Dollar note then executed by J. Harold Giles, still such fact would not
support the claim of the Bank of Heber Uity and
its succe-ssurs that the certificates may be held as
security for the note sued upon in Cause No. 1266
Civil. It is elementary that a surety may not be held
on an obligation to vvhieh he has not consented to
be surety. In this· case all of the original obligation was paid off except possibly the 811111. of rrwo
Hundred Dollars. The time for paying the indebtedness of J. Harold Giles to the hank "\Vas extended
many _times. Such is the evidence and such is the
finding of the court below. ( Testiinony of Riley
C. Draper, Tr. 200-201 ~ A b. 254; Finding No. 21,
Ab. 94). There is a complete lack of evidence tending to show that Josie Baird Giles cons en ted that
the certificates of stock might be hP1d by the ba11k
as security for the paymPnt of any rene,val or any
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notes of J. Harold Giles. The law applicable to
this phase of the case is thus stated in
21 R. C. L. 1004:
'~It is fundamental that any a.gree1nent ot
dealing bet\veen the creditor and the pril.~
cipal in an obligation or debt which essentially varies the terms of the contract without the consent of the surety will release
the surety frorn liability.''
In the same volume at Pa.ge 1018 it is said:
"It is a familiar rule that if a creditor, by
positive contract, with the princip~al debtor
and without the consent of the surety, extends the time of payment he thereby discharges the surety. ''
Numerous cases are cited in support of the foregoing text, but the la'v as therein stated is so
familiar that we refrain from citing further
authorities.

ELIZABETII J. BAIRD, HAVING PURCHASED
THE STOCK CER'riFICATES BECAUSE
THE ASSESSMENTS THEREON HAD NOT
BEEN PAID, IS THE O·WNER OF THE
CERTIFICATES.

By thPir ass.ignments appellants attack the finding
of the trial court to the eff{_)ct that Elizabeth J.
Baird did not purchase and \Vas not the o'vner of
r.ertifieates numbered 64 and 68. Touching the
assessments levied against those certificates the
evidence shows : On February 7, 19~13, an aS'sessffiE;\nt of Three Dollarg per share was levied upon
all the primary stock of the Lake Creek .Irrigation
Company. Notice of the asAessment was sent to the
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stockholders and published in the ·Wasatch V\""ave.
(Tr. 302-304; Ab. 177-178). The stock upon \Vhich
the assessment was not paid was bought in by the
Lake Creek Irrigation Company and by action of
the Board of Directors the stockholders whose
stock "\\ras sold were given until O·ctober 1, __1933 to
redeem the stock. (Tr. 304-305; Ab. 178-179).
The secretary of the company was authorized to see
if the Bank of Heber City would 1·edeem the stock
of Josie Baird Giles (Smith). (Tr. 306; Ab.179).
The bank was notified of the assessment but did
not pay the same. ( Tr. 318; A h. 185). Under date
of February 7, 1934, Mrs. James R. Baird, who is
one and the same person as Elizabeth J. Baird, paid
the amount owing upon the stock of Josie Baird
Giles (Smith). (Tr. 307; Ab. 180-181). The only
reason a ne\v certificate was not issued to Elizabeth
J. Baird ~as because the old certificates \vere not
surrendered to the company. (Tr. 311-313; l\h. 1~2183). While the records of the I.Jake Creek Irrigation Company are not as complete as n1ight be desired, s.till such records do sho"r that a subPtantial
compliance with the laws of this State relating to
the levy and collection of assessments \vas. duly
ma.de. Any unceTtainty in the re-cords as to a
complianc~ with the law is made certain by the orfll
testin1ony of J. Thomas Crook, president of the
l.Jake Creek Irrigation Co1npany. (Tr. ;-300-320 and
B27; Ab. 176-185). \Vhen a stockholder is given
personal notice of an assessment there is no necessity of giving any other notice.
Witcomb v. Geannini, 43 Cal. App. 2'27; 184
P. 881.
Lexington & W. C. R. Co. v. Chandler, 13
Mete. (Mass.) 311.

In this case the L.ake Creek Irrigation Co1npa.ny
was not required to give the Bank of HeheT City
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notice because it "ras not a record owner of the
stock and in nny event the bank may not at this late
date be heard to con1plain of any irreg;ul~rities in
the making of the assessment or in advertising the
stock for sale.
Hatch v. Lucky Bell Min. Co., 25 Utah 405;
71 P. 865.
In this connection it may be observed that an irrigartion co~pany such as the Lake Creek Irrigation
Company is not required to publish notice of assessme-nts.
'
R. S. U. 1933, 18-4-10.
If the stock was lawfull)r sold because of the nonpayment of assessment, it follows that the claimed
lien of the bank has ceased to exist.
Fletchers Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol.
.4, Page 595, Section, 1866.
Thus, in any event, any lien that the Bank of Heber
City may .have had on the water stock represented
by the certificates numbered 64 and 68 must give
way to the rights of Elizabeth 'J. Baird.

ARGill1:ENT TOUCHING THE CLAIM OF '_rHE
MOU.LTONS TO THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND
DO.LLAR:NOTE AND J\10RTGAGE ON THE
L1\ND AND W A'l'ER TO SECURE TH;E
PAYMENT THEREOF.

As one of the defenses to the suit brought by the
MrJultons in Civil Case No. 1410 the appellants
~laim that before the Moultons atten1pted to levy
on the note in question Josie Baird Giles (Smith)
and V ~rnor E. Baird had agreed to cancel the tran~action and had further agreed that the property
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covered by the deed and mortg:age should be conveyed to Elizabeth J~ Baird in payment of the debt
which Josie Baird Giles~ (Smith) o"\\red to her
mother, Elizabeth J. Baird. This being an equity
suit, appellants are entitled to have this (Jonrt review the evidence and pass upon the weight thereof. In a number of the assignments of error appellants have attacked the findings of the trial court
to the effect that no such agreement was entered
into: Assignments Numbered 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 3'5} 36, 37, 41 and 45

By

a~signments

numbered 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53
appellants attack the conclusions of law \Vhich arP
to thP effect that the ~{oultons are the owners of
the note and have a lien on the land and water
stock as security for the payment of the note. For
similar reasons appellants by assignment No. 54
attack the decree. A substantial portion of thP
evidencP before the trial court, either directly or
indirectly touches the question of 'vhether or not
the agreement had between ,Josie Baird Gil~~
(Smith) ·and Vernor E. Baird for the sale and purehase of tlu~ land and water stock was by mutual
agreement bP.tween .Josie and Vern or cancelled
One ~of the questions \Yhich 'Ye deem of controlling
importancP iR whether or not the 'evidence i~ such
as require~ a finding that such agre·ement \Yas entered in tn before the attemnt \vas made to a tta.ch
the' note. Whille e~idence \vas offered touching
.the question of \vhether Josie owed her mother any
tnoney, and if so, the amount thereof, sur.b ques ..
tion is not in our view of controlling importance.
That is to say, if Josie "\\Tas without right to enforce p,ayment of the note against Vernor at the
time the Moultons attempted to attach the note,
then. and in ~uch case, the M.oultons cannot prevail
in 'their suit on the note. Such is the law indepen..1._
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dent of statute and such is the express provision of
our statute.

R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-27.
If Josie. could not .enforce the fifteen thousand
dollar note again~t \rernor, the same may not be
enforced by the Moultons. The Moultons· have not
levied an attachment or execution on the land aud
\Vater stock covered by the mortgage, but only upon
the note. If the i\Ioultons have any claiin against
the land or "rater stock it must he because they
acquired title to the note pursuant to the attachment execution. V\Thile the appellants. offered evidence as to the circumstances under which Eliz. .
abeth J. Baird acquired the land and water stock,
such evidence was offered becaus~ the transaction
whereby Mrs. Baird acquired the land and water
was inseparably connected with and in a s.ense was
a part of the transaction whereby Josie released
Vernor from an obligation to pay the not.P.
It is difficult in a brief, without repeating~ the entire testimony} to give a reviewing court a word
picture of all of the evidence. We shall~ howevf\r.
direct the Cnnrt's _attention to those portions of
the evidence which in our view clearly show 'vherein th~ truth lies: On October 10, 1929, Josie, who
w·as then the owner of a tract of ·'land and a water
right u~ed to irrigate the land, conveyed the same
to her brother Vernor. Some of the water right
was represented by t\vo eertifica.tes of capital
~toek in the Lake Creek Irrigation Con1-pa.ny. The
certificates are numbered 64 and 68. Other water
appears to have been appurtenant to the land.
Nothing was paid on the purchase price of the- land
and water at the time of the transaction, but Vernor and hiR 'vife Mary executed a. note for the prineipal ~urn of Fifteen Thousand Dollars, payable
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on or he.fore ten years after date. To secure the
payment of the note a mortga.ge was executed by
Vernor and his \vife Mary. (Ab . 82 to 84). By the
terms of the mortgage on the land and water 'it is
alleged that
''This mortgage is given collaterally with
a chattel mortgage of even date herewith
1nad,l hy the nlol'tgagors in favor oi the
mortgagee to secure the payment of one
certain promissory note.'' etc. (.Ab. 36).
The deed executed by .Josie, the note and Invrtgage e-xecuted by V ~rnor and his wife. and a chattel · mortg·age were .all made out by George B.
Stanley. The deed and mortgage were ackno·wledged by :him as a notary. The deed and real
estate mortgage· "\\7ere delivered to Vernor. Th8
note was left with and retained by George B.
Stanley until he delivered the same to the Sheriff
of \V asatch Connty at the time George B. Stanley
brought ~.uit fo1· the Moultons.. The chattel mortgage vvns never completed but \Vas retained by Mr.
Stanley. Thus, Josie did not pQrsonally receive
either the note, the real estate mortgage or the
chattel mortgage. (Testi~ony of Josie Baird Gile~
(Smith), (Tr. 64-72; Ab. 125-127: Tr. 82-83; Ab.
129; testimony of George B. Stanley, Tr. 405-41~,
Ab. 210-211). Josie's testimony on both direct and
cross examination· is to tlH~ effect that Vernor was
unable to p~ay the note. That he paid only ten dol~
lars thereon; that at one time hP gave her a check
but the s.ame wa.s returned because of insufficient
funds {Exhibit B). That sh~ went with Vernor to
Salt Lake to s.ee what could he done about making
payment. That he waR unable to secure any money.
(Tr. 66-72, Ab. 126-127; Tr. 79, Ab. 128-129; rrr.
92-94; A b. 132; Tr. 105, ._t\_b. 135). The testimony
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of '':illiam H. Baird is to the san1e eifect (Tr. 144147; Ab. 143). It is also the testin1ony of V' ernor
E . Baird, ( Tr. 360 to 363, A b. 1~9; 'l,r. 3oi·, Ab.
200). It also appears fron1 the records of the Lake
Creek Irrigation Company and the tes.tin1ony of its
president that the assessinent levied upon the wa.te1·
stock in 1933 "~as thereafter p~aid by Elizabeth J.
Baird. (Tr. 306-309, Ab. 180-181; '11r. 311-312:; A h.
182, 183).
According to the testimony of George B. Stanley,
Josie failed to call for the note until after it was
attached, notwithstanding he, Stanley, informed
her that he would levy on the note for the Moul·
tons if she did not con1e and get it. ( Tr. 412; A b.
211). There is no evidence to the contrary. It
does appear that Vernor signed a blank application for a loan with the Wasatch Livestock Loan
Company, in \vhich app,lication the note, listed as a
liability, was filled in by an employee of the loan
company. (Exhibits 14 and 15, dated November
3, 1933 and October 24, 1934, respectively). Neither
of these exhibits were filled out when signed, and
J. Clyde Mitchell, a witness called by thP J\tloultons, testified that the Wasatch Livestock LQRn
Company kne'v that Vernor did not claim ti.tle to
the farm at the time the application 'vas. made.
Thus, the testimony of Mr. Mitchell in no way im-peaches but corroborates the testimony of Vernor
to the effect that the note was regarded as cancelled and the only reason that it was not returne·d
to Vernor is because it was held by Mr. Stanley.
It will also be noted that in the affidavit for a writ
of attachment in Case No. 1261, Plaintiffs' Exbib.it
1, madP by the Moultons. under date of June 21,
1934, before George B. Stanley, notary public'! it
is averred that the defelldants are endeavoring to
conceal their property and that plaintiffs arEl
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apprehensive that unless a writ of attachment is
issued, the defendants will dispose of or conceal
their property. The only property that Josie
owned was the fifteen thousand dollar note and
mortgage, excepting the note signed by her husband, J. Harold Giles, for the sum of Twenty-five
Hundred Dollars. Obviously if .Josie should conceal or sell the note of J. Harold Giles, such concealment or sale would not _prevent the Moultons
from collecting on the notes signed by Josie and
J. Harold Giles. If Josie was attempting to dispose of her property as alleged in the affidavit, it
must have been the fifteen thousand note because
she owned no other property and had no Income
excepting what her mother gave her. (Tr. 128;
A b. 140; Finding No. 28; A h. 9'7).

As heretofore indicated the question of whetl1er
or not Josie "\vas indebted to her mother is not of
controlling; importance, for the reason that any
elaim that the Moultons have is founded upon the
note and that alone. If Josie had no right to sue
Vernor and his wife on the not~, the }.r!oultons have
no such right because, as we have pointed out, the
Moultons, by the proceedings had, could at mo.st
acquire only such right as Josie had. Howevef.
the question of whether Josie owed her mother any
money may bear indirectly on thp principal question. The evidence on this phase of the case is lik~
\vis.e all to the effect that Josie did owe her n1otlier
about six thousand dollars at the time Vernor conveyed the real estate and water covered by the
mortgagp to ~his mother. Josie testified tha.t at
the time- her father's estate was s.ettled she received more than her share of the estate r'nd that
she gave her mother a note for thirty-five hundred
dollars, and that her mother furnished Josie with
the money for the support and maintenance of
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herself and the n1inor child. (Tr. 76, 79, 85, 93, 94
and 99; Ab. 128, 130, 132 and 134). Such is also
the testimony of ·vvm. H. Baird (Tr. 143, 162; Ab.
143-146). That Josie received money for her own
support and for the support of her minor child is
established beyond any question of a doubt. J .
Harold Giles did not give Josie any money for
her support or the support of her minor child after
the spring of 1930. (Tr. 167; Ab. lj"O).
Jo;;:ie expected and agreed to p:1y her mother
from the money "Thieh Vernor was to pay
J o::-:ie; but only ten dollars \vas ever pa1d by \r ernor on the not~ and mortgage. On July 9, 1934
Josie brought an action in the District c;ourt of
Wasatch County for a divorce from J. Harold
Giles. The ground for the divorce 'vas the failure
and refus.al of the defendant to provide plaintiff
with the common necessities of life. In the complaint and the findings of the court it \\as alleged
and found that defendant .J. Harold Giles had
"
failed to provide Josie Baird Giles
with the eommon necessities of life and that the p~laintiff Josie
'11ad no meanR or money "\vith V\rhich to pay the clerk
thA filing fee or the officerR for serving proceBs.
(Files in Case 1256, which were admitted in evidence and are all part of the record on appea 1).
It "rill be noted that the divorce action "Tas filed
nearly a month before the sheriff served the writ
of attachment.
Some of' the files in the probate p~roc€ec1ings of thP
eRtate of James R. Baird, deceased, father of
Josie, 'vere received in evidence. (ExhiEit No. 8).
It will probably be contended that these files tend
to impeach the testimony of J o~ie and her brother~ V 0rnor and \~Villiam.
There is., however,
nothing in such file which in any manner eonflicts
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with the testimony of) ~ither ~11liam, "Jo13ie or
Vernor. It was made to appear that Elizabeth J.
Baird, the mother advanced some money to the
estate of James R.' Baird, deceased, to pay the expenses of the administration. In order to balance
the account in the probate proceedings it was nP-Cef~ ..
sary to make provisions for reimbursing Mrs.
Baird for the money so advanced. This. was done
by a number of the children giving Mrs. Baird
notes. Such transaction does, not in any way tend
to show that Josie did not, as both she-. and. "\~lilliam
testified, receive more than her share of the estate
and that she gave her note to her mother for
Thirty-five Hundred D·ollars. If Mrs. Baird sold
to Josie a part of the property \vhich Mrs. Baird
was entitled to, there ''ras no occa.sicn for such a
transaction to appear in the probate proceedings.
That Josie did receive more than her share and
that she gaYP h(lr note therefor, is established
without any conflict in the evidence. (Testimony
of Josie, Tr. 73-76, Ab. 128-12.9; Tr. 85 to ;88. Ab.
130-131; testimony of ·Wm. H. Baird, Tr. 44, Ah.
143). That Elizabeth J. Baird advanced money
for the support of Josie and her child is established
without doubt. Not only is there no evidence to
the contrary, but the surrounding circumstances
show that such must have been the fact.
Josie and her child of necess1 ty. required money for
food, shelter and clothing. All of Josie's property
\Va.s tied up in the note V\rhich Vern or and his wife
gave her, but upon which only ten dollars was,paid,
and the note of her husband, J. Harold Giles, for
Twenty-five Hundred Dollars upon 'vhich nothing
was paid. Josie's husband provided nothing- foT"
her support after the spring of 1930, and because
of such failure Josie filed suit for divorce in 1934.
Josie received nothing "rhen she signed the note~
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sued upon _by the ~Ioultons in the action "'here an
attempt 'vas made to levy upon and sell tho fifteen
thousand dollar note. (Tr. 1~3; Ah. 139). ~,he
1\loultons make no claim to the contrary. In her
testimony on both direct and cross exa1nina tion
Josie testified as to the money she received from
her mother. There i~ not the slightest reason to
disbelieve the same. It also appearR that the Moultons _paid only one hundred dollars for the fifteen
thousand dollar note, \vhich would seem to indicate
that even the Moultons knew or believed that thenote \Ya.s of little or no value. It \Vould p·robably
serve no us.eful purpose to here repeat all of that
testimony. Doubtless, the members of the Court
will read the same. ,,~e earnestly urge that ~uch
testimony be read and feel confident that \vhen the
same is reviewed the members of the Court will be
convinced that Josie spoke the truth \Yhen she testified that in 1933 she owed her mother about six
thousand dollars. The court beloW1 committed
grievous error \Vhen it held that she \vas not indebted to her mother, Elizabeth J. Baird.
1

We. have already directed the Court's attention to
the evi4ence touching the agreement between Josie
and Vern or to cancel the note, but before leavn1g
this phase of the cas.e we "'~ish to call attention to
circumstances independent of direct evidence which
point unerringly to appellants' contention that
Josie and Vernor had ag'reed that the note should
be cancelled and the only reason that it \Ya8 not
returned to Vernor 'vas because it \vas held by ~Ir.
Stanley, who, shortly after S osiP brought the
divorce action against her hus.band, J. Ha.rold
Giles, conceived of the idea that it was high tin1e
to levy on the fifteen thousand dollar note if h~
'vns to hP able to satisfy the clajm of his ne"v ly
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acquired clients, the · Moultons, and incidentally
enable him to secure an attorney's fee of three hundred seventy dollars. lVlr. Stanley testified that
he pTepared the deed from Josie to Vern or for the
fiffteen thousand note, the real estate mortgage
to secure the pote and a chattel mortgage, ·w·hich
had never been completed. Mr. Stanley further
testified that neither Josie uor VerHoJ.· L~·.-er calJed
for the note and that he told Josie that he was go ..
ing to levy on the note for the Moultons at least on
three occasions and still Josie did not make any
attempt to get the note until after it was dehvered
to the sheriff~
Here was a note rep,resenting a small fortune, at
least to one reared in the country as ·\\ra~ Josie,
and yet, if Mr. Stanley is to he believed, she did
not consider the note of sufficient importance to
even a§k for the s.ame, and that notwithstanding,
she was told at least three times that if she did
not call for the note it would be disposed of for
whatever the Moultons were \villing to pay on the
notes which they held against Josie. and her husband. Such behavior on the part of Josie is so contrary to human experience that even if the obligation on the note had in fact been eancelled by reason of the agreement between Vernor and Josie,
it is most improbable that l\1:r. Stanley's testimony
in such particular is true. If the note in fact hall
not be-en cancelled s.uch conduct on the part of
Josie is almost beyond belief. The evidence snows.
and this Court \viii take judicial notice of the fa.ct.
that about the time Josie and Vernor entered into
the contract for the/ sale and purchase of the farm
and \vater stock the price of farm produce and livestock began to decline in value and that by 1932
and 1933 farmers and livestock owners were unable
to pay the running expenses of their husiness, much
less pay interest and princip~al on a fifteen thousand
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dollar note. In this rase it also appears tha.t
Vernor owed a substantial sum to the \Va.satch
Livestock Loan Company.
\Vhen Josie brought the action for divorce she 'vas
without funds to pay the filing fee and cost of
serving process. _If the fifteen thousand dollar
note was at that time a subsisting oblig~ation it is
indeed difficult to believe that her brother Vernor
would not have advanced her sufficient money t.o
bring th~ divorce action or that she would be so
forgetful of the truth as to verify a complaint
wherein it is alleged she was without money with
which to bring the divorce action. Under these
facts and circumstances what ".,.as more natural
than that Josie should conclude that Vern or could
not possibly pay the note and that to save the expense of foreclosure the note should be cancelled,
w·hich, 25 the evidence offered by the appellants
shows~ was done. It is also significant that soon
after the evidence shows the agreement was entered
into between Vernor and Josie and 1\frR. Baird,
the latter arranged to and did pay the assessment
on the certificates of stock "'rhich represented the
water used to jrrigate the land covered by the rnortgage. If the trial court's findings are to be sustained it was Vernor's obligation to pay the water
assessments. but there is nothing which sllo,vs ur
tends to show that Vernor concerned hims.elf about
the water assessments.

It also appears ·that Vernor did not retain possession of the farm after the year 1933. ( Tr. 362-363 ;
Ab. 199). Moreover, if the trial court's finding
with respect to the lien of the. Heber City Bank is
to be sustained, Vern or had a right to rescind the
contract of purchase and repudiate the note as to
Josie, and likewise as to the Moultons, who in any
ovent acquired no gTrater right than Josie ha.d at
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the time of the levy. If Josie in fact hypothecated
the 'vater stock which was used to irrigate the land
to pay all pres.ent and future obligations of J.
Harold Giles, such action by Josie constituted a
breach of the covenant of the deed to Vernor and
gave the latter, upon a discovery of the breach,
a right to rescind the note up·on reconveying the
land and water to .Josie or her nominee, i~lrs. Baird,
just as was done.
An attempt 'vas made· to hnpeach Wm.,H. Baird
by Mr. Stanley as to what wa~ said by ~iilham
before the County Commissioners. (Testimony of
Wm. H. Baird~ Tr. 170, Ab. 147; testimony of
George B. Stanley, Tr. 404, Ab. 208). It is, to say
thP h~ast, ::;.trange that if the statements tes,tified to
by Mr. Stanley occurred before the nu1nerous ·witnesses that he claims were present, none of those
'\Vitne~ses 'vere called to corroborate what Mr.
Stanley cla.ims to. be the far.t. In any event, the
attempt to impeach 'V"m. H. Baird is 'vithout value.
No one claims that any consideration passed from
VE:'rnor to ~Mrs,. Baird at the time the land and
"rater 'vere reconveyed by Vern or to his mother.
The conveyance was- made to the mother as part
of the agreement that the· fifteen thousand dollar
note should be cancelled. If ""\Vm. H. I~aird djcl.
make the R.tatement that Mrs. Baird did not pay
Vernor anything for the deed, such statement, if
made, in no 'vay tends to r."nt.ra.dict the facts aR
testified to by appellants' -witnesses..
We have- thus briefly summarized the· evidencA
touching appellants' claim that by agreement the
fifteen thousand dollar note was cancelled; long hefore it was levied upon and that the eourt below
\vas in error in its finding and conclusion to the
effect that the note was a subsisting obligation
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pwing by \:-- ernor E. Baird and his \Yife ~fa.ry at the
time :J[r. Stanley turned the note oYer to the sheriff of \V-asatch County. The action of the Maultons being, as it is, founded on the fifteen thousand
dollar note, such note Innst be a binding obliga,tion,
as otherwise the action of the Moultons must fail.
If the note was cancelled before the t:an1e was delivered to the sheriff of 1Vasatch County, there is
nothing upon which an action can be founded.

THE PRETENDED LEVY ON THE FIFTEEN
THOUSAND DOI . I_JAR NOTE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES DISCLOSED BY THIS
RECORD PR-ECI.JUDES THE MOUL1'0NS
FROi\I CLAil\liNG TITL.E TO THE NOTE.
We have already directed the attention of the
Court to the evidence which shows that G.eorge B ..
Stanley prepared the de~d from Josie to Vernor,
the fifteen thousand dollar note and the real
estate mortgage to secure the same, and a chattel
mortgage which was never executed. The deed and
real estate mortg·age " ere delivered to Vern or and
the note sued upon in this action was rAtained by
!\f r. Stanlev
. until it 'vas delivered to the sheriff of
\V. a.satch County under the pretense that the sheriff
\vas attaching the same. Both the sheriff and Mr.
Stanley, somewhat !eluctantly, admitted such to he
the fact. (See testimony of Virgil Fraughton, Tr.
J56, Ab. 115; testimony of lV[r. Stanley, Tr. 414,
.Ab. 212). Mr. Stanley further testified that he
was not an attorney at all when he made out the
deed, note, real estate and chattel mortgages; that
he 'vas admitted to practie~ in 1\{ay, 1931, and that
h0 had never been the attorney for .Josie Baird
7

.
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Giles (Smith). (Trn 400; Ab. 206). Mr. Stanley
further testified that he ma.de the papers out at the
request of Vernor and that he was to deliver the
note to Josie. ('rr. 410-411; Ab. 211).

It is provided by the statutory law of this State
that:
"It is the duty of an attorney and counsel . . . .

5. Tol maintain inviolate the confidence
and at every peril to hims.elf to preserv~
secrets of his client: . . . .
To comply with all duly approved rules
and regulations prescribed by the board of
commissionerR of the Utah State Bar and
to pay the fees provided by law "
9,

R. S. U. 1933, 6-0-25
''An attorney and counselor who receives
n1oney or property of his client in the
course of his professional busineBs and "\\ ho
refuses to vav or deliver the same to the
person enti tied thereto within a reason,..,
able time after demand i~ guilty of a nusdemeanor''
7

R. S. U. 1933. 6-0-41
The rules of the Utah Bar providP:
"Rule 6, I)aragraph 3 thereof: The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidence. and forbid also thP
subsequent acceptance of retainers or einployment from others in matters adverRP . .
ly affecting any interest of the client with
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1·espect to which confidence has bP.en re..
posed.''
''Rule 57, The duty to preserve Iris client's
confidence outlives th~ la\vye-r's employment. etc. ''

It is suggested that because Mr. Stanley "\Vas not an
attorney at the time he made out the documents
for \'ernor and Josie be should not be held to the
code prescribed for attQrneys. That the work of
preparing the -documents for Josie and Vernor was
practicing· la"\v is, so far as we are advised, supported by all the authorities.
People v. Title Guaranty Trust Co1npany,
230 N. Y. 578.
Judd v. The City rrrust & Savings Bank,
1B3 Ohio St. 81; 12 N. E. ( 2d) ,28R~
People v. Weil, 260 N. Y. S. 65ft

It would be strange indeed to say that one who unlawfully practice-s law may disregard the rules
applicable to one who is entitled to practice. The
authorities teach that the law does. not so favor one
\vho is not admitted to practice. Any other rule
\vould reward rather than punish one engaged in
the unlawful practice of law.
Moreover, the work which Mr. Stanley undertook
before he was admitted to practice was never completed. He testified that he undertook to completA
the transaction by prep~aring the chattel mortga.a:P
and to deliver the note to Josie. He never did
either. He was an attorney when he delivered the
note to the sheriff in furtherance of the scheme to
make Vernor pay the note in full and to deprive
Josie of any interes.t she might have had in the
note. In doing so he used the knowledge and confir10TIC1P reposed in him by Vernor and .} osie in an
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attempt to benefit himself and his newly acquired
elients, the 1\Ioultons. Such attempts are uniformly condemned by the courts, and an attachment or
execution levied under such or si1nilar circumstances are to he held void and of no effect whatever. The. law is thus stated in
7

c. J. s.!

415:

"It may be stated as a general rule that
when a levy is effected by any imprope:r·
means as for instance by the use of any
fraudulent device to obtain possessior1 of
property it will be invalid ''

rro the same effect is the law s.tated in
6 0. J. 245, Section 469.
A. number of cases will be found in the footnote
to the text in

Note 17 in C. J., Page 245.

The same rule applies to execution. A levy which
is procured through fraud, trickery or trespass is
invalid. When the officer or creditor or other per..
son repres.enting the creditor fraudulently o1·
wrongfully acquires possession of property for the
purpose of levying on it, or where the property i~
brought vvithin the jurisdiction of a court for the
purpose of being leviecl on through any frand o,~
other 'vrongful act, the courts. uniformly strikP
down a sale had under such circumstanees.
23 C.

,T~

432 and cases there cited.

'rhat Mr. Stanley, in wilfully turning the fifteen
thousand dollar note to the sheriff, used the knowL
edge he acquired while actjng for J-asie and \Tf~rnor,
cannot admit of doubt. That he wrongfully delivered the note to thP sheriff~ entrusted to him
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to be delivered to Josie, is equally clear. lie seeks
to justify his "Tongful act in such re~.pect by the
claim that he warned Josie he was going to do the
wrongful act at leas.t three tin1es before he did it.
He does not claim, ho,vever, that either Josie or
Vernor authorized him to deliver the note to the
sheriff so that the sheriff could sell it for whatever the Moultons were willing to pay - in this
case the sum of one hundred dollar.s.
The courts of this !lnd other States have gone a
long way in requiring that attorneys exercise the
utmost good faith tovva.rds their clients.~ Public
policy require~ that those standards be not relaxed.
If in this case the action of lVIr. Stanley in turning
the fifteen thousand dollar note over to the sheriff,
which he was obligated to deliver to Josie, under
the pretext that th~ same vvas attached .and sold
under execution for the sum of one hundred dolLars shall be approved, then indeed 1nay an attorney reap a handsome revvard for hin1self and one
of his clients, at the expense of another client. The
law does not permit an attorney nor his client to
collect an o1Jligation, no matter ho"\v valid the claim
may be, by such procedure. As appears from the
authorities heretofore cited, a valid levy upon
property by either attachment or under execution
must he free from the taint of fraud, trickery or unlawfulness before any rights may be acquired as
result of a levy and sale.
The Moultons claim and the court below found that
George B. Stanley did not have possession of said
note as the attorney for Vernor E. Baird, Mary .1\..
Baird or Josie Baird Giles (Sn1ith), or for any of
the defendants; that George B. Stanley at no tin1e
has been or acted as attorney for .Josie Baird Giles
(Smith). (Finding No. 14; Ah. 88). We have
attacked that finding. If, as the court found, ~fr.
1
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Stanley did not have possession of the note for
either Josie or Vernor, we are at a loss to conceive
from this record for whom he s~ecured and retained possession of the note. ~Ir. Stanley appar·
ently had no doubt about the fact that he held the
note for Josie. He testified that at least three
times he told ,Josie to come and get the note. If, a.s
the court found, 1\Ir. Stanley was not holding, the
note as Josie's ag:ent, then, and in such case, the
note was never delivered. Josie could not maintain an aetion on a note which had never been delivered to her, and by the same token the Moultons
may not maintain an action on the note, because
they acquired no greater right than Josie had at
the time of the levy. An undelivered note is. not
subject to he levied upon by attachment or writ of
execution.
Erskine v. Nimours Trading Corp., 239
N. Y. 32; 149 N. E. 273.
l)os Passos v. Martin, 21.8 N. Y. 517.
Steese v. Steese, 251 N. Y. S. 164

THE AFFIDAVIT FOR THE W R. IT 0 F
ATTACHl\fENT WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE SO THAT THE CI_JERK ·W A.S WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A W"'RIT OF
ATT~~.CHMENT AND THE SHERIF~F WA~
\'TJTI-IOlJT A1JTHORITY TO L.E.VY lTPON
THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOljL.AR
NOTE.
An examination of the affjdavit filed by tlie Maultons shows that the same does not comp,Iy with
the law The grounds and the only grrounds upon
\vhich the Moultons sought and secured a. y;rit of
attachment 'vas that:
''The defendants own or hold an interest
in real and perRonal prop-erty; that they
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are endeavoring to conceal, that tho plain-tiff n1ay not realize upon any judg1nent
which ma.y be obtained in the ahove entitled action and that plaintiffs are apprehensive that unless a writ of attachment
is issued the defendants \Yill dispose of or
conceal their property; ·that execution on
any judgment obtained in this action will
be returned "\vi.thout satisfaction.''
It "rill be- observed that nowhere in ,the affidavit is
there any allegation that the amount or the indebtedness claimed as owing to the Moultons is an obligation over-and above all legal counter-claiJJL.q_
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-3 requires s·\l·Ch aD
allegation.
''·Where the statute requires the affiant
to show that .defendant is indebted to
plaintiff in the am~unt specified, or that
the latter is entitled to recover such an
amount over and above all legal payments.
setoffs or counter-claims, compliance with
this statute is ess.ential to cover jurisdic..
tion to issue the writ.''
7

c.

J.

s.

293.

To the same effect is
6 C. J., Page 132.
Numerous cases are cited in the footnotes, particularly
Notes 2 ·and 3 to the Text of C. J.
support thereof.

1n
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Moreover, the affidavit for the attachment does
not comply with the requirements of
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1 and 104-18-3,
in that it does not set fo;rth any of the grounds
mentioned in 104-18-1 as required by s,ubdivision
5, 104-18-3. Apparently an attempt was made by
the affidavit to come under either subdivision 3
or 6 of R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1. but the affidavit
does not comply with either. It is not alleged
that the defendants, or either of them, have
assigned, disposed of or concealed or are about to
assign, dispose of or conceal any of their property
with intent to defraud their creditors. Ohv1ously
the defendants had a perfeet right to either conceal or dispose of their property to pay debts owing
to other creditors, or for any other reason so long
as such acts 'vere not for the purpose or 'viil1 the
intent to defraud their creditors. Nor does the
affidavit bring the Moultons within the provisions
of Subdivision 6 of R. S. U. 1933. 104-18-1.
No facts whatever are set forth in the affidavit
which shows or tends to show that ·the 11oultons
were justly apprehensive of losing their 'claims unless. a 'vrit of attachment issue. Apparently there
waS' ·a very good reas:On why the affidavit did not
·so allege,' namely, there -are no facts justifying the
issuance of an attachment. If the fact be as the
record shows, that the only property which Josie
had was thp fifteen thousand dollar note, wnich
was in the possession of Mr. Stanley and which
Josie refused to call for, notwithstanding Mr.
Stanley had told her at least three times to come
and get the same, there "\Vas no basis, in fa,ct for an
attachment.
"\"!Jlere plaintiff is required by statute to
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tent to defraud his creditors . . . . and
the nffidaYit fails so to charge, it is insufficient to sustain an attachn1eut. ''
7 C. J. S., Pag-es ~99 and 300, and cases
cited in the f ootnotG.
Where plaintiff is required to show that there is a
probability of losing his debt, that fact should
appear by a sufficient allegation. The reasons for
the apprehension of losing! the debt should be sho,vn
by a statement of facts upon- \vhich the fe~a.r .of
loss is based and facts should be .set forth showing
that the property owned or possessed by defendant
subject to attachment p.robably will not be avail-·
able to execution w-hen the judgment is had.
7 C. J. S. 304, and cases there cited
Among the cases so cited is one from this jurisdiction:
Western Auto Comp~any v. Gurnea, 73
Utah 423. 2'74 P. 862~

An affidavit for an attachment must be made in
compliance with the form and requisites p1·ovided
by statute and the facts. required to be stated in
the affidavit must appear therein with the required p~articularity or the court acquire~ no juri~
diction to issue the vvrit.
7 C. J. S., Sections 111 and 112, Pages
276~ 277.
Moreover. the bond for the attachment is fatally
defective in that the bond shows on its face that
it is not executed on the part of the plaintiff as
required bv
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-4,
and is not executed by t\Y'o sureties as required hy
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-4 and
R. S. U. 1933, 104-54-16.
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While the name of Chas. Anderson is signed on
the bond, it does not appear in the body of (the bond
that he obligated himself on the bond, and likewise, while. the name of Chas. Anderson is signed
at the end of the verification, it does not appear
that he was sworn. In such case the bond was insufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of
attachment.
Summerton Livestock Co. v. Early, 111
S. C. 154; 96 S. E. 518.
It may here be noted that the words ,., on the part
of the plaintiff" would see1n to be the equivalent
of ''by the plaintiff.''

THE EXECUTION ISSUED IN CAUSE 1410
WAS F AT.A. LLY DEFECITIVE1 1AND COINFERRED NO AUTHORITY ON THE
SHERIFF OF "\V~J\SJ'-'-TCH COUNTY TO
SELL THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND l)OLLAR NOTE INVOI.JVED IN THIS CONTRO·VERSY.
We have a statute.
R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-1,
'vhich provides :

Subdivi~ion

3.

''If property has been attached in the
action it (the writ of exeeution) shall rP-..
quire the officer to satisfy the same so far
as may be done out of the attached property.''
Notwithstanding the sheriff had taken possession
of the fifteen thousand dollar note under the writ
of attachment, the execution issued in cause No.
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1261 did not comply 'vith the mandatory provision~
of the la'v above quoted and therefore the sheriff
was "Without authority to advertise for sale or sell
the note .
Gillman v. Tucker, 59 N. Y. sup·ra 570; 13

N. Y. S. 804.
Place v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT NOTICE 0~,
SALE OF THE NOTE ·wAS EVER POS1,ED
AS BY LAW REQUIRED.
.
The return of the sheriff on execution i~ a part of
the files in Civil Case No. 12.61, 'vhich files were
offered in evidence by the Moultons and received.
In that returnf it is recited among other things
I

''That the sheriff did on the 21s,t day of
January, 1935 levy on the property hereinafter described and noticed the same for
sale as the law directs anq on the 29th day
'
of January, 1935 at 9 :30 A. M. of said day
at the front door of. the court house in
He-ber City, Wasatch County, Utah, the
time and place fixed for said sale, I did
attend and offer for sale at public auction
for lawful money of the United States thP
property described as follo,vs.''
.

Then follows a descrip~tion of the fifteen thousand dollar note and the mortgage to secure the
payment thereof, certain interests in \Vater stock,
a mortgage on water appurtenant to the land; nil
of "\vhich was sold for one hundred dollars. The
evidcnRe conclusively Bhows that the only notice
of sale given by the sheriff "ras a notice, a eopy
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of which was received in evidence and n1arked as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4. Another copy is marked
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12.
It will be noted that by the said notice the sale was
to be had on January 28, 1935, at 10:00 o'clock,
A. M. The sheriff proposed to sell the interest of
the defendants in the fifteen thousand dollar note,
mortgage given to secure the note, an interest in
some 'vater stock held by the Bank of Heber City,
49 shares of the p-rimary stock, 34 shares of firstclass high water right, 23 shares of second-class
high water right and 8 shares of third-class hig-h
water rigiht of the L~~e Creek Irrigation Company,
representing 'vater rig'ht appurtenant to the lands
deBcribed in the mortgage. We assume that the
l\ioultons will not claim that under the proceedings had any land, interest in land, water stock or
water appurtenant to the land "\vas levied upon or
sold or attemp,ted to be sold hy the sheriff.
The sheriff was "\vithout authority to s.ell real
estate pursuant to the notice. No publication wa~
had in a newspaper, nor 'vas noticd [posted for
twenty days as requi.red for the sale of re!al estate.
R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-18.

Nor did the sheriff, according to his testimony,
offer for sal~ or sell anything other than the fifteen thousand dollar note. ·1Had ~he, sheriff attempted to sell all of the property de~igtnated in
the notic-e as a whole, his actions in such particular would doubtless be void as offending against
thP. provisions of

R. S. TJ. 1933, 104-37-23~
We shall therefore confine our discussion to thP
note and if respondents claim that the sheriff sold
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anything other than the note \Ye may \Yish to meet
such clain1 in a reply brief.
While the notice of sale indicated that the sale wa8~
to be had on the 28th day of Jnuuary, 1935 at 10:00
A. M., the return of the sheriff sho\Y8 that the sale
actually took place on the 29th day of January,
1935, ·at 9 :30 A. M. An exanuna tion of the return
shows that the 29th repre~enting the date of .Januarv and the hour 9:30 have both been changed.
Th~ trial court p~rmitted the sheriff, Virgil
Fraughton, to testify over the objection of appellants that on the 28th day of January he postponed
the sale to the next day at 9:30. Appellants assign
such ruling as error. (Assignments 3 and 4; Ab.
225-226). The sheriff further testified that as he·
recalled 1\Ir. ~[organ called on the 'phone and asked
to have the sale postponed, but he conld be mi~
taken. ( Tr. 16; _t\_b. 115). That a year or so ago
Mr. Morgan came into the sheriff's offiee and
made inquiry about the sale, but that he, the ~Sher
iff, did not then recall or say anything about postponing the sale. The sheriff further testified that
he made a memorandun1 of postponing the sale in
a book. Over objection of appellants the book was
received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. The
admission of thP book into evidence is assigned a.s ·
error (Ab. 226). Th(:\ memorandum .about postponing the sale is the last entry on that page of the
book and the only ~ntry in the book relating to
sales. J. Rulon l\f organ testified that he did not
call up the sheriff about postponing the sale; that
he \Vas at Heber City on the 28th day of January.
1939; that he watched to see 'vhat thP sheriff din
about the sale. That the sheriff did not postponP.
the sale. ( Tr. 39-42 ; A b. 120-121). W rn. H. Baird
testified that he "ras vvith J. Rulon Morgan on
.Tannary 28, 1935, and that the sheriff djd not
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appear at the fron_t door of the court house and
postpone the sale. (Tr. 43-44; Ab. 121). Notwithstanding this. state of the record, the trial court
found that ,J. Rulon Morgan did call up the sheriff
and the sheriff did postpone the sale. Appellants
have assigned such finding as error. (Assignments 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 2.2; A b. 231-232). While
it is competent for the sheriff, if need be, to refresh his memory by· referring to the book, ·Exhibit
5, the entry therein was not comp~etent evidence.
22

c. J.

89'5.i

When the sheriff makes a return as required by
law, such return becomes a. public record and may
not be varied by the sheriff's oral testimony. If
the return is in error it may, with leave of court,
be amended, but until am.ended it is (l;Onclus.ively
presumed to state the truth.
Huish v. Fenkell et al, 85 Utah 253; 39 P.
(2d) 330.
Moreover, in light of the uncertainty of the tes~ti
mony of the sheriff as to what occurred in coimection with the sale:~ and in light of the written return
ma.de by him, soon after the sale, and the testimony of Mr. Morgan and Wm. H. Baird. there is
little room for doubt as to where lieR the preponderance of the evidence touching the failure of the
sheriff to either make or postpone the sale on the
date fixed in the notice. Moreover, neither in the
sheriff's return nor in his oral testimony is there
any evidence that a notice was p.osted in three public places. The return merely recites tha.t the
notices were posted as required by lavt, "rhich is
a pure conclusion. The oral testin1cny of the
sheriff adds nothing to such conclusion. If the
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erty at a subsequent date, a sale on the latter date
'vas equivalent to a sale 'vithout notie(:~.

In the absence of a proper notice of sale the sam(\
is void or of no effect.
Henderson v. Hays, 41 N. J. 2387.
Hughes v. \V.att, 26 Ark. 228.
Collins v. Smith, 57 Wis. 284.
In re Phillips Estate, 86 Utah Jf)S; -!:-! Pac.
(2d) 699 and cases there cited.
THE CONSIDER.L\.TION PAID FOR THE NC)TE
\\:-AS SO GROSSLY INADJ(JQlT.A.TE THAT
A COURT OF EQUITY vVILL NOT PERMIT
THE SALE TO STAND.
There are expressions in some cases to the effect
that courts "\\rill not set aside a sale solely because
of an inadequate price. However, when there are
irregularities in the proceedings antedating the sale,
or where there is any unfair dealing, in connection
with the sale in addition to gross inadequacy of
price, the courts uniformly refuse to recognize the
validity of a sale.
23 C. J. 680 and cases there cited.
We have heretofore pointed out that there were
irregularities in every step had in the proceedings
whereby the l\Jloultons pretended to attach and Rell
under execution the fifteen thousand dollar note.
Many of such proceedin~s, as we have pointed out,
were not mere irregularities, but 'vere so .contrary
to law as to render the l~vy and sale of the note
void and of no effect. V\T e shall not repeat what
we have heretofore said.
Some of the present counsel for the Monltons seem
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teen thousand dollar note upon which there Waf{
nearly six yea.rs accrued interest for one hundred
dollars is so shocking to the conscience of a court
of justice that at thE; trial they stated that they
\vould not ask for a deficiency judgnu~nt against
Ver~or and would credit on the judgment against
,Josie and J. Harold Giles the amount they will
realize fro1n a sale of the property. Such promise,
which the court below imvroperly characterized as
an agreen1ent, does not alter the situation or support th~ sale of the note.
Hamilton v. Burch_ 28 Ind. 233.
Gallagher v. Abadie, 26 La.. Ann. 343_
.

I

CEB;TIFICATES OF STOCJ{ N1T~1BEREJ) n4
AND 68 HAVING BEEN PURCHASED BY
EI~IZA.BETH ,J. BAIRD· FR,Ol\1 THFJ LAKE
CREEK IRRIGATIOIN COl\tiPANY, "\VHICII
ACQUIRED TITLE THER,ETO BECAUSE
OF A ]j-,AILURE TO PAY ASSESSnlENTS,
ARE NOT IN ANY EVENT S fJBJECT TO
A LIEN AS SECURITY FOR TI-IE PAYMENT OF THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND
DOLLAR NorrE.
What we have heretofore said touching the sale
of the two certificates of stock numbered 64 and 68
in connection with the claim of the Bank of Heber
City is applicable to the claims of the Moultons.
we shall not repeat our contention in sucn respect. ,If Mrs. Baird acquired title to the t'vo certificates, as appellants contend she did, it neeessarily follows that the l\foultons have no valid clain1
against such certificateB.
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JOSIE BAIRD GILES S~IITH AND J. I{ULON
MORGAN, AS EXECUTOR llb' 'l,HE L.A.Srl.t
'VILL .A.ND TESrrA~tENrr OF, E.LIZABE1'l:f
J. BAIR-D. H..:-\.\TE ...L\. l~.IGHrr 'rO .I\. HU~1E
STEAD IN THE :B,IFTEEN THOUSAND
DOLLAR. NOTE .L\Nl) 1.~Hl~ I.JAND -4\KD
\V.A.TER STOOl{ CO\rER.ED BY THE
~IORTGAGE.

After the trial court orally announced wha~t his
decision would be, .Josie Baird Giles S1nith and .J.
Rulon Morgan, as executor of the __ estate of Elizabeth J. Baird, deceasedj filed a petition in these
causes. wherein they alleged, among other things,,
that from October 10, 1921 up to J·uly 16, 1934,
Josie Baird Giles and J. I-Iarold (tiles '\vere husband
and . \vife.
.
That there '\Tas one n1inor child, thP.
issue of the marriage, \Vho at all times fi·om the
date of her birth to and including- February 1~ 1935,
resided with said Josie Baird Giles. and was
dependent upon her for support. That prior to
the time that .Josie Baird Giles made, ex~cuted and
delivered the warranty deed to Vern or E. Baird
on October 10, 1929, Josie Baird Giles, and hor husband, resided upon the property mentjoned and
described in the mortgage and used the property
as their home and for the support of ~J Of3ie and her
husband, J. Harold G-iles, and the child, the issue
of the said marriage, and tha.t Josie also used the
watE?r rigllt represented by the certificates of stock,
togetJ1er with the 'vater appurtenant to the land to
irrigate the same.
That neither Josie Baird Giles nor J. Harold Giles.
at any time prior to February 1, 1935, o"\vner1 any
real estate other than that mentioned. That .ToRje
Baird Giles was at all times, prior to ],ehrua.ry 1,
1935. an actual and bona fide resident of v\T asa.t~h
County, Utah. That on October 10~ 1929~ Josifl
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Baird Giles made a deed to the property n1entioned
in the eomplaint filed herein and that Vernor E.
Baird: and his \vife, Mary, delivered to Georg·e B.
Stanley the note and mortgage mentioned and set
out in the complaint; that Josie Baird Giles never
Tece~ived any payment on the note excepting the
:)urn of ten dollars, and that she never, at any time,
recPived the fifteen thousand dollar note. r~ehe
petitioners claimed that· Josie Baird Giles was entitled to a homestead ELxemption of any interest that
i3he might have in the note and the property given
to secure the same and that Elizabeth .J. Baird was
entitled to any exemptions that Josie may ha:ve ha.d
to the p~roperty covered by the note. (. A.h. 70 to
72). An answer was filed to the petition, ,vhich in
the main denies the alleg1ations in the p1eti tion (A b.
73). Thereafter a stipulation was entered into between the parties as to the facts, \\ hjch will bP
found on pagoe 75 of the abstract.
7

The cl::dm to some or all of the property involved
in this controversy, or the proceeds to be deriveu
from the sale of such property, must of necessity
proceed upon the assumption that the issues raised
in the main case have been properly decided a,gainst
the appellants. In our argument that J. Rulon
Morgan, as executor of the last will and te·stament
of Elizabeth J. Baird as grantee of Josie Baird
is entitled to any homestead exemption that ,Josie
\Vas entitled to assert, \Ye of course do not 'vish to
concede that the·re is any occasion under the facts
in this case to rely upon a homestead.
The Stta.tutory provisions· upon which we relv arP, ·
R. S. lJ. 1933, 38-0-1 ·

''A homestead cons'iRting of land~, appurtenaner:R and ]mprovements 1 W'hich lands
Inay be in one or more localities, not exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceeding in value with the ap~purtena.nces and
improven1ents thereon the sun1 of $2,000.00
for the head of the fnmily and the further
surn of $750.00 for the spouse, and $300.00
for each other member of the fan1ily, shall
be exempt from judgment lien and from
execution or forced sale.'· etc.

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2·:
''"lb.en a homestead is. conveyed by the
o"\vner thereof, ~uch conveyance shall not
subject the premises to any lien or encumbrance to which it would not be subject in
the hands of the o'\\7Jler, and the proceeds
of the sale thereof, to the amount of the exemption existing at the time of s.a.le, shall
be exempt from execution or other ;process
for one year after the receipt thereof by
the person _entitled to the exemption ''
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-8 :

"It shall be the privilege of either the huRband or the· \vife to claim and select a hoJnestead to the full extent prescribed in this
title on the failure of the other, being the
judgment debtor, to make such claim or
selection. ' '
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-10:

''A home~tead claimant may make a declaration of homestead in the manner rrovided in the next t'vo sections, but a failure to make such declaration shall not impair the hon1estead right.''
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-15 :
"The homestead shall not he sold if thP
bid does not exceed the valup, of the e:xSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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emption \vhen the homestead 1s In one
piece.'' etc.

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-19 ~
''If homestead peoperty js sold on execution,
the proceeds paid the judgment debtor shall
be exempt from execution or other process
for one year after receip~t thereof by the
person entitled to the exemption.''

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-4:
"Water rights and interest either in the
form of corporate stock or otherwise, owned
by the judgment debtor shall be exen1pt
from execution to the extent that such
rights and interest are necessarily employed in supplying water to the homestead for domestic and irrigation purposes.''

R. S. U. 19.33, 38-0-13:
''If the owner is married, no conveyance
or encumbrance of, or contract to convey
or encumber, the premises selected and recorded as a homestead prior to the time of
such conveyance, encumbrance or contract
is valid unless both the husband and wife
join in the execution of the same.~'
The provisions of our hom~stead law have been
before and construed by this Court on so many
occasions that we do not deem it necessary to examine cases from other jurisdictions touching the
matters raised in the petitions of Josie Baird Gil~s
(Smith) and J. Rulon Morgan.
The Petitioners contend: rrha.t Josie Baird Giles
(Smith) was entitled to a. claim for a home·~dead to
the amoltnt of $2,000.00 for herself, $-300.00 for her
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minor child, and $750.00 for her husband. As to
her right to a homestead for hersL·lf and the child
there 'Yould seem to be no serious doulJt. It \vill
probably be contended that in any event Josie had
no right to make the c1aim of $750.00 for J. Harold
Giles in light of the fact that she secured an interlocutory decree of diYorce fro1n hhn on July 16,
1934. However, the divorce did not become final
until six n1onths after it ''Tns granted and therefore
J. Harold Giles was the husband of .Josie Baird
Giles at the time the note. was 1delivered to the
sheriff, as 'Yell as at the time the note is claimed
to have been sold under execution sale. It is held
In re Johnson's Estate, 35 P. (2d) 305,
that the entry of divorce decree does not at once
terminate marriag~e relationship and give the parties the status of single persons ; that the marriage
relationship is dissolved when decree becomes final
which is· six months after the date of entry.

It will be observed that
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2 and 38-0-19
provide that theo proceeds derived from the sale of
a homestead shall be exempt from execution for
one year after receipt thereof by the p·erson entitled to th~ exemption. Moreover, if Josie was
entitled to claim a homestead exemption for herself and the minor child, the sale of the note !or
only one hundred dollars was a nullity.

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-15 provides:
''The homestead shall not be sold if the
bid does not exceed the value of the exemption when the homestead is in one piece,''
etc.
The note was one obligation and the sheriff was
without authority to sri~ the same until and unless
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the claim of a homestead was, first satisfied.
the case of

In

Payson Exchange Bank v. Teitjen, (13 Utah
321; 225 P. 598, at Page 325 of the Utah
report it is said :
''The great weight of authority, under
statutes similar to ours, is to the effect
that a judg.ment is not a lien against
premises impressed with the homestead
character and subject to the ho1nestead
use, and that an attachment or execution
attempted to be levied thereon is absolutely void."
And again on Page 32·6 of the Utah report it is
said:
"The fact~ however, is that in legal effect
an order of a court directing a sale of
exempt prop~erty is stillbqrn, and, like an
execution, is without any effect whatever.''
It will probably be contended by the Moultons that
the sheriff being without notice of the claim of
homestead by anyone, such clai.m vvas waived.
There are some cases from our own Supreme Court
which hold that a homestead claim n1ay be made
at any time before sale. Among the cases so :holdIng are
1

1-Iansen v. Mauss, 40 Utah 361; 121 P. 605.
Payson Exchange Savings Bank v. Tietjen, 63 Utah 321; 225 P. 598.
Bunker v. Coons, 21 Utah 164; 60 P. 549.
Folsom v. Asper, 25 Utah 229: 71 P. 315.
None of· these cases, however, are authorities for
the converse, namely that the homestead right is
\vaived unless asserted at or before sale. In any
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event none of these cas.es aid thP M.oultons, for th('
obvious reason that before the sale of tlte note in
question, the mortgage had been released and
property covered by the Inortgage conveyed to
Elizabeth J. Baird, both of 'vhich instru1nents ·11ad
heen placed of record in the office of the County
Recorder of asat.ch County before the sale of tho
note, and such recording in1parted notice to all per~
sons dealing with the property that Josie Ba:ird
Giles and her mother, Elizabeth J. Baird, claimPd
that the p~rop~erty 'vas not subject to sale.

''r

~Iore-over,

in the absence of notice of levy and sale
to the claimant, the right to assert a homestead
is not waived.
Kimball v. Salisbury, 19 Utah 161; 56 P.
973: 17 Utah 381, 53 P. 1037.

Notice to sheriff before sale is ·sufficjent. Bunker
v-. Coons, Hansen v. niauss and Payson Exchange
Savings Bank v. Teitjen, suprBIndeed it is said in the Teitjen
Page 326 that:

"It

ca~e,

~upra,

at

may also be doubted whether an offi-

cer or anyone else under any eircunlstances may sell or dispose of a homestead
without becoming liable unless he does so
with the cons.ent and approval of the homestead claimant, and if such claimant he
married, then with the consent of both husband and wife.''
Following the last quotation this Court cites cases
which it apparently believes support the doctrine
that a sale of' a homestead rig·ht is a nullity unles~
consented to by the parties interested.
Tt will probably be contended on behalf of the
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Moultons that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) does not
bring herself within the provisions of
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2 or 38-0-19
because the note 'vas executed considerably more
than one year prior to the date of the sheriff's sale
thereof. It will be ·remembered that all of the evidence is to the effect that Josie never, at any time,
had the :actual custody of the note. She did not in
the language of }the statute, "receive" the p·ro·Ceeds of the sale of the land and shares of capital
stock whicl,t she conveyed or agreed to convey to
Vernor. The only evidence in the record is that of
Josie where she testified that she reeetived only
$10.00 from V_ernor, which of course would pay the
interest for only a few days. .If, aS' we assumed in
preparing our pleadings in the original action, 1\fr.
Stanley had conceded that he waR the attorney for
Josie and that as such his possession of the note
was tb~-possession of Josie, there might be merit
to a claim that Josie had "received" the note,
which was the proce·eds of the sale. However, he
disclaims any such relation to Josie and app,arent. .
ly takes the position tha.t he V\ras not the agent or
attorney for Josie. If such be the fact, then in
contemplation of law, Vernor never parted with
the note, in which event it would be idle to say that
tToRie ba.d received the proceeds of the sale of th~
farm.

It is in effe·ct stated in the findings that .Josie could
have received the note had she so desired. The
statute does not either by exp,ress word~ or by itnplication say that the proceeds of the sale of extempt p:rop,erty shall be exempt for one year after
the party claiming the exemption could ha:ve re ..
ceived such proceeds. Quite to the contrary it
says ''after the r~ceipt thereof.'' To cons.true this
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lang·uage to n1ean after the claimant could have
received the proceeds 'Yould be doing Yiolenee to
the express provisions of the statute.
~he principles announced by this

Court 1n the

cases of
Christensen v. Beebe. 32 ·utah 406 · 91 P.

129, and

.

'

Giesy-Walker Co., Y. Brig-gs, 49 Utah 205;
162 P. 876,
preclude the J\1:oultons from suc:cessfully 111aking
the claim that Josie had received payment for the
farm a.nd water stock.
If the note of Josie ,,~as exempt from levy on execution she had a right to dispose of it as she saw
fit. The Moultons could not complain if she ga:ve
it a'vay, cancelled it or sold it to someone else. In
other \Yords, the ~1 oultons could not by the levy of
an attachment or execution deprive her of s11ch
right. Even though she did not have a right to
dispose of the whole note, she none th~ less. had .an
absolute right to dispose of such part of the note
as equalled her exemption. If she ch osn, to cancel the note and mortgage in return for the farm
she had, within the lin1its of her exemptions, a right
to do so.

R. ~- lJ. 1933, 38-0-9.
In snch ca:se tbP 1\foultons havp no just cause to
complain.
Moreover, Elizabeth J. Baird acquired the exempt
property free from any claim of the judgment
creditors of Josie. If one entitled to a homestead
exemption is unable to convey the exempt property
freed from the claim of the judgment creditor, then
of course the handR of the judgment creditor are
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tied so that such a person could not dispose of
property to which he has an absolute right unfettered by any claim of the judgment creditor. Such
is the 1clear p~ronouncement of our statute and such
has been the doctrine repeatedly announced by this
Court

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2..
Pa.yson Exchange Savin~s Bank v. Teitjen,
63 Utah 321 ; 225 P. 598.
Antelope Shearing Corral Co. v. Con.
·wa.gon & Mach. Co., 54 Utah 355; 180
P. 597.
V olker-Scowcroft Lumber Company, etal,
v. Vance, et al. 36 Utah 348; 103 P.
970.
By the levy of an attachment and execution on the
note and the taking the same by the sheriff, Josie
could not be deprived of her right of a homestead
claim in her own right or he deprived of her right
to convey such exempt property to others. To permit such a result "\vould constitute a limitation or
deprivation of the right, \\ hieh the law does not
countenance. This right was exercised by .J osi.e
before the sale insofar as she "\Vas able to exerci~e
the right
7

As to the claim of a hon1estead exemption to the
stock held by the bank:
We have already directed the Court's attention to

R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-4.
\vhere it is provided that water used upon e~empt
real property is exempt. As early as 1898 our
Sup1reme ·Court held that the homestead exemption is not a mere privilege conferred upon the head
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of a family} but an absolute. right, intended to
secure and protect the hon1e ag~ainst creditors. as
a means of support to eyery family in the State,
and no waiver of the homestead right could affect
the interest of the \vife and children composing
the family.
\Vhen the homestead consists of one or more pieces
of land \vithin the value lin1ited by statute, and is
established by selection or occupancy, the constitution and statute enacted under it are a positive
prohibition against levy and sale thereof by creditors of the owner of the homestead.
Kimball v. Le,vis, 17 Utah 381; 53 P. 1037.
\Ve have also heretofor~ called the Court's atten-

tion to
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-13
That section was rconstrued in the case of
Nielson v. Peterson, 30 Utah 391; 85 P. 429.
By a divided Court it was held that a husband could
mortgage his interest in p~roperty used as ~ residence by the family where there was no recorded
declaration of a homestead. Mr. Justice- Straup
in a dissenting opinion took the view that the wife
not having joined in the mortgage had a right to
lay clajm to and preserve the home for herself and
family. In that case it was exp-ressly held that the
husband was without authority to mortg-age any interest that 'the wife might have. The stock involved in the case belonged to the wife. H~r interest could not be jeopardized by any act of the husband. Certainly her right a8 an owner to home~tead prop1erty is entitled to as much protection as
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would have been accorded her if she had declared
a homestead in her husband's prop.erty. If thP~
rights of a married woman, especially in property
\vhich constitutes a homestead 1nay be disposed o£
by the husband in the manner shown by the evidence in this case, then indeed has the vvife a long
way to travel before she is emancipated.
We submit the claim of a homestead as agJainst
the attachment and sale under execution bv the.
~\1 oultons should be sustained, and like~se ··upon
this record, if for no other reason, the clai1n of a
homestead right in the water stock preclndeR the
bank from maintaining its~ lien.
The evidence in this case shows. that at the request
of Elizabeth J. Baird a.note for five thousand dollars was given to Morgan & Morgan for the purpose of securing them in the paym~nt of a fee and
to enable them to, if possible, secure money to protect the water stock held by the Bank of Heber
City. The note was given just before the deed was
executed by Vernor to his mother. Vernor signed
the mortgage because his mother \\. .as in California. The mortgage by Vernor to Morgan &
Morgan and the deed from Vern or to his mother
.were placed on record a day or two before the
sheriff sold the fifteen thousand dollar note. It
also appears that ·Wm. fl. Baird as attorney in
fact for Josie released the mortgage of record a
day or two before the note was sold. Of cours.e we
do not contend that the execution and recording
of these instruments could affect any lien or claim
that the Moultons may have had in the land cov-ered by the mortgage. The finn of 1\Iorgan &
Morgan of course kne\v that such was the law, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67

the recording of those instrun1ents \vould preclude
anyone \vho nlight have purchased the note at the
sheriff's sale fron1 claiming that he 'vas an innocent purchaS'er of the note, believing that it was
secured by a mortgage. As these transactions· do
not affect the questions presented for determination on this appeal, \Ye refrain from further discussion of the same.
We submit that the judgment. and decree appealed
from should be reversed and the trial court dire·cted
to recast its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
decree and judgment to the end that appellants be
awarded judgment to the effect that neither of the
respondents haH any lien on the water and land
involved in this litigation, and that appellant~ b~
awarded their costs.
Respectfully submitted,

J. RULON MORGAN,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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